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The Intersection of Patent
Infringement and Antitrust Liability




A battle has been raging, over the past ten years, regarding the competing in-
terests of patent protection and antitrust prohibitions in the specialized area of law
concerned with patented drugs regulated by the Food and Drug Administration
("FDA").' The contestants are the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") and par-
ties to Abbreviated New Drug Application (ANDA) litigation, which are a brand-
ed drug company and a generic challenger.2 The ANDA litigation parties, two
* Kevin E. Noonan, Ph.D., partner, and Nicole E. Grimm, associate, at McDonnell Boehnen Hul-
bert & Berghoff LLP.
1. The Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98
Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §355(b), 0), (1); 35 U.S.C. §156, 271, 282)("the
Hatch-Waxman Act"). See, e.g., In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 190-92 (2d
Cir. 2006) (discussing the statutory and regulatory framework of the Hatch-Waxman Act). In brief,
Congress passed the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 to encourage competition between generic and brand
drugs. Under this Act, companies seeking to market a generic version of a patented drug may com-
plete an Abbreviated New Drug Application ("ANDA") and rely on a prior determination by the FDA
that the patented version of the drug is safe. See 21 U.S.C. § 3550). When the manufacturer of a
generic drug files an ANDA, they must certify that, to the best of its knowledge, the generic drug does
not infringe the patent covering the brand or innovator drug. Id. § 3550)(2)(A)(vii). One way for the
applicant to satisfy the certification requirement is to certify under paragraph IV of § 3550)(2)(A)(vii)
"that such patent is invalid or will not be infringed by the manufacture, use, or sale of the new drug for
which the application is submitted." As an incentive for generic drug manufacturers to challenge drug
patents, the Hatch-Waxman Act grants the first generic manufacturer who files an ANDA, i.e. the
"first to file", with a paragraph IV certification a 180-day exclusivity period in which the FDA will not
approve any other ANDA applications for the same generic drug. Id. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv).
2. The Hatch-Waxman Act makes it an act of patent infringement to file an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) containing a paragraph IV certification with the FDA in the face of an innovator,
or branded drug company, having regulatory approval to market a drug and a patent or patents on said
drug, a formulation of the drug or methods of making or using the drug. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A)
(2010). Generally, generic drug makers filing an ANDA trigger this infringement provision by assert-
ing that the patent or patents listed with the FDA for an innovator drug (in a listing known as "the
Orange Book") are not infringed, or are invalid or unenforceable. The patentee then has 45 days to file
suit, which invokes a 30-month stay in any approval of the generic drug maker's ANDA by the FDA.
ANDA litigation is unlike any other patent infringement case. The accused infringer is not on the
market and accordingly is not at risk for a damages assessment, and has not put investment at the risk
of an injunction. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'r, 402 F.3d 1056, 1073-74 (11th Cir.
2005) ("It is uncontested that parties settle cases based on their perceived risk of prevailing in and
losing the litigation. Pre-Hatch-Waxman, [the generic challengers] normally would have had to enter
the market with their products, incurring the costs of clinical trials, manufacturing and marketing. This
market entry would have driven down [the patentee's]'s profits, as it took sales away. As a result, [the
patentee] would have sued [the generic challengers], seeking damages for lost profits and willful
infringement. Assuming the patent is reasonably strong, and the parties then settled under this scenario,
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prior adversaries, are generally defendants in complaints brought not only by the
FTC, but by consumer groups, drug wholesalers, retailers, and states' attorneys
general. These complaints allege that the ANDA litigation parties have violated
antitrust laws through settlement agreements used to end ANDA patent litigation.
The gravamen of this complaint is that the branded drug-maker has generally set-
tled with the generic challenger on terms where the generic challenger is either
paid money, or otherwise granted something of economic value, in exchange for
refraining from entering the marketplace as early as it would have if the generic
company had prevailed in the litigation. These settlement agreements have been
termed "reverse payment" or "pay-for-delay" settlement agreements. On the
other hand, the generic drug generally has entered the marketplace sooner than it
would have otherwise been able if it had lost the ANDA litigation. However, the
FTC argues that these settlements are acknowledgements by the branded drug-
maker that the patents at issue are "weak," or otherwise subject to invalidation or
a finding of unenforceability. Thus, any delay in generic drug entry is anticom-
petitive and a violation of the antitrust laws. 4
During the 2013 term, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved the question of the
legality of "reverse payment" settlement agreements, in FTC v. Actavis.5 While
the Court did not find these agreements presumptively illegal, the Court held that
they were susceptible to antitrust scrutiny and should be evaluated under a "rule of
reason" analysis. 6 In so holding, the Court overruled the majority of courts of
appeal that have deemed the practice free of antitrust implications, for reasons
directly related to the nature of the activities giving rise to such litigation and the
exclusivity rights conferred by patents. Specifically, in ANDA litigation, it is the
patentee who bears all the risk that her patent will be found invalid or unenforcea-
ble. As a consequence, over the past decade patentee-drug innovators have in-
creasingly adopted the "reverse payment" method of settling ANDA litigation.
This practice has raised antitrust concerns from consumers, but most especially by
the FTC, which has initiated and participated in antitrust suits as a plaintiff or
amicus.
II. THE FTC's POSITIONS
The FTC's original position regarding "reverse payments" was that these
agreements are per se violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act as an "unreasonable restraint of trade." Accordingly, the Commission called
the money most probably would flow from the infringers to [the patentee] because the generics would
have put their companies at risk by making infringing sales.").
3. The term "reverse payment" refers to settlement agreements that require the patentee to pay the
accused infringer.
4. Including, inter alia, Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act (Sherman Act, July 2, 1890, ch. 647,
26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. § 1-7) and Section 5 of the Clayton Act (Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914, Pub.
L. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, enacted October 15, 1914, codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 12-27, 29
U.S.C. § 52-53).
5. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
6. The rule "tests 'whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby
promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition." Board of
Trade of City of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918).
7. See In the Matter of Abbott Labs., A Corp., & Geneva Pharm., Inc., A Corp., C-3946, 2000 WL
681849, at *6 (F.T.C. May 22, 2000); In the Matter of Schering-Plough Corp., A Corp., Upsher-Smith
[Vol. 201452
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for an outright ban on such agreements.8 Having universally lost in courts on this
theory, as set forth in more detail below, the FTC has moderated its position, ad-
vocating that "reverse payment" agreements are presumptively illegal and should
be reviewed for antitrust liability under a "quick look" rule of reason approach.9
The quick look approach requires that the court find any reverse payment agree-
ment that delays a generic company from entering the market in exchange for
payment as prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation due to an unreasonable
restraint on trade. 10 A party can rebut this finding by showing that the payment:
(1) was for a purpose other than to delay market entry of the generic company; or
(2) provided a pro-competitive benefit.
There are several reasons for the FTC's crusade against "reverse payment"
settlements. First, generic competition decreases the costs of drugs to consumers
and, more importantly, to the Federal government, which is the largest drug pur-
chaser in the country if not the world. Second, generic drug companies are moti-
vated under the Hatch-Waxman Act to challenge patents because the first generic
company to file an ANDA with a certification that its product does not infringe or
that the innovator's patents are invalid or unenforceable, garners a 180-day exclu-
sivity period as the only generic on the market.12 Third, reverse payment settle-
ments upset the statutory purpose, permitting "bad" patents to remain in force and
delaying generic entry. 13 Fourth, generic drug companies prevailed in ANDA
litigation against brand-name drug companies 75% of the time between 1992 and
2002.14 Finally, the FTC contends that branded drug companies enter into reverse
payment arrangements because they know that their patents are invalid or unen-
forceable, and the agreements permit them to undeservedly collect "monopoly"
profits.
The factual underpinnings of the FTC's contentions that reverse payment set-
tlement agreements of ANDA litigation require antitrust scrutiny, are set forth in
Labs., A Corp., & Am. Home Products Corp., A Corp., 9297, 2001 WL 418903, at *1 (F.T.C. Apr. 2,
2001); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
8. See Federal Trade Commission, Pay-for-Delay: How Drug Company Pay-Offs Cost Consumers
Billions, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/pay-delay-
how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal-trade-commission-staff-
study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf [hereinafter Pay-for-Delay Report].
9. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2237 (2013) ("The FTC urges us to hold that reverse
payment settlement agreements are presumptively unlawful and that courts reviewing such agreements
should proceed via a 'quick look' approach, rather than applying a 'rule of reason."').
10. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 218 (3d Cir. 2012).
11. Id.
12. 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5)(B)(iv) (2013).
13. Pay for Delay Report, supra note 8, at 8.
14. See Federal Trade Commission, Generic Drug Entry Prior to Patent Expiration: An FTC
Study, at viii (2002), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/generic-
drug-entry-prior-patent-expiration-ftc-study/genericdrugstudy 0.pdf (providing incentives for brand-
name companies to pursue these types of agreements).
15. This conclusion has been almost universally rejected by the Courts of Appeal until very recently.
See Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2010); In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2008); In re Tamoxifen
Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 206 (2d Cir. 2006); Schering-Plough Corp., 402 F.3d at 1075-
76; and Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1311 (11th Cir. 2003). As a result
(in part) of FTC advocacy against these agreements, Congress enacted as part of the Medicare Pre-
scription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2000. 342 U.S.C. § 1395w-101 (2009) ( 110
of the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2009) (§ 1111-1118 of the Act), 21 U.S.C. § 3550)(5) (2009) (§ 1102 of
the Act) (provisions requiring all such agreements to be filed with the FTC).
53
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more detail in a series of reports issued between 2010-2013 on the subject. In
2010, the FTC's report characterized these agreements as harming consumers
while enriching both innovator and generic drug makers, due in large part to a
delay up to 90% in the reduction in the cost of a branded drug that occurs upon
generic competitor entry in the market.16 The report notes that the FTC "deterred"
the use of such agreements, between April 1999 and 2004, buttressed by a single
court of appeals decision, which held that these agreements are per se illegal.
17 However, later appellate decisions have upheld "reverse payment" agree-
ments," which the Commission contends is "misapply[ing] the antitrust law[s]".19
As a consequence, the FTC's report contends that generic drug entry has been
delayed for an average of seventeen months, and that in 2009, pay-for-delay
agreements "protect at least $20 billion in sales of brand-name pharmaceuticals
from generic competition."20 The report estimated that the "cost to American con-
sumers was $3.5 billion per year."21
The 2010 report noted that there were 66 agreements that "involved some
form of compensation" for delayed entry, between fiscal years 2004-2009. During
the same period, ANDA litigation was settled without pay-for-delay agreements in
152 instances.2 2 Of the 66 agreements involving delayed generic entry, 51 (77%)
were between the brand-name pharmaceutical company and the first generic com-
pany to file an ANDA.23 These data were significant, because "[s]ettlements with
first-filer generics can prevent all generic entry," since the generic company to
first file an ANDA has a 180-day exclusivity period to market the generic version
of the drug, which it is entitled under the Hatch-Waxman Act.24 Thus, delaying
market entry for the first ANDA filer prevented any subsequent ANDA filer from
entering the market until the first filer has utilized the 180-day exclusivity period.
Not all settlement agreements between generic and brand-name drug manu-
facturers involve direct cash payments to the generics companies, The FTC's re-
port describes other arrangements, including an agreement from the brand-name
pharmaceutical company not to introduce an "authorized generic," ("AG")25,
which are not excluded by the 180-day exclusivity period awarded to the first to
file an ANDA.26 This type of agreement was included in about 25% of the "pay-
for-delay" agreements discussed in the report.27 The situation was no better a year
later, and the FTC's 2011 report contained a tabulation of reverse payment settle-
ment agreements by year, up to the date of publication.28 Finally, by the time its
16. Pay-for-Delay Report, supra note 8, at 1.
17. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
18. Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n., 402 F.3d 1056, 1076 (11th Cir. 2005); In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d Cir. 2006); In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochlo-
ride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
19. Pay-for-Delay Report, supra note 8, at 1.
20. Id. at 2.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 4.
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. (emphasis in original).
25. Id. at 5 (i.e., a generic version of the drug made by the brand-name company).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Paradoxically, the Report actually showed the percentage of reverse payment settlement agree-
ments in overall decline during the period from 2004-2011; Federal Trade Comm'n, Overview of
Agreements Filed in FY 2011, A Report by the Bureau of Competition, at 2 (2011), available at
[Vol. 201454
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2013 report was published, the Commission's data indicated that the "vast majori-
ty of patent settlements (greater than 70%) continued to be resolved without com-
pensation to the generic manufacturer."2 9 This trend reflects the impact of the
FTC's campaign against pay for delay agreements. Currently, instead of a cash
payment provision, the majority of agreements contain an agreement from the
innovator not to bring an "authorized generic" version of the drug to market, in
competition with the generic drug maker.
Not surprisingly, the FTC has taken the position that agreements involving a
promise by the innovator not to market an authorized generic should also be pre-
sumptively illegal, applying the following reasoning.30 First, authorized generics
"destroy... a significant amount of the value that a generic company otherwise
would obtain from [the] 180-day.. exclusivity period."1 Second, a branded com-
pany's agreement not to market an AG "enables the generic company to maximize
its revenues during the first-filer exclusivity period." 32 Finally, these "economic
realities" compel the conclusion that "a no-AG commitment is without a doubt a
method of paying a generic company for delayed entry."3 3
III. DEVELOPMENT OF A CIRCUIT SPLIT ON THE LEGALITY OF REVERSE
PAYMENT AGREEMENTS
Despite the FTC's protestations, U.S. Court of Appeals have developed dif-
ferent positions on the legality of reverse payment agreements. While Circuits
including the Sixth and Third Circuits adhered to the position that reverse settle-
ment agreements are per se illegal, the Second, Eleventh, and Federal Circuits
rejected this position, finding that these agreements are not anticompetitive so
long as they do not exceed the scope of the patent. To resolve this circuit split, the
U.S. Supreme Court granted the FTC's petition for certiorari in the Eleventh Cir-
cuit's landmark decision, Schering Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Commission,
which paved the way for reverse payment agreements between brand and generic
drug companies. The Supreme Court rejected both approaches, and held that
courts must apply a rule of reason analysis to determine the legality of a reverse
payment agreement.
A. The Sixth Circuit Finds Reverse Payments Agreements per se Illegal
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig.,34
issued the first appellate decision on reverse settlement payment agreements. The
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-
under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-modernization/ 111 0mmaagree-2.pdf.
29. Federal Trade Commission, Overview of Agreements filed in FY 2012, A Report by the Bureau
of Competition, at 2 (2013), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/
agreements-filed-federal-trade-commission-under-medicare-prescription-drug-improvement-
and/130117mmareport.pdf.
30. See In re K-Dur Antitrist Litig., 686 F.3d 197, 207 (3rd Cir. 2012).
31. Federal Trade Commission's Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae Brief, In re Effexor XR
Antitrust Litig., No. 3:1 1-cv-05479 5 (D. N.J. Aug. 10, 2012) available athttp://www.ftc.gov/sites/
default/files/documents/amicus briefs/re-effexor-xr-antitrust-litigation/1 208 1 0effexoramicusbrief.pdf.
32. Id. at 7.
33. Id. at 9.
34. See In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
55
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decision supported the FTC's position, but was based on facts not found in later
cases that have upheld such agreements. The Cardizem case was brought by a
variety of patient groups against Hoechst Marion Roussel (HMR) and Andrx, over
a settlement agreement containing a reverse payment provision. The settlement
agreement at issue ended ANDA litigation over a patent for HMR's drug, Card-
izem CD.15 Andrx filed an ANDA for Cardizem CD, and asserted antitrust coun-
terclaims in the ensuing litigation. On the same day that the 30-month stay ex-
pired, the parties settled.36
The settlement agreement provided that Andrx would not market a generic
version of Cardizem CD until either: Andrx received a final determination in its
favor in the patent infringement lawsuit; HMR or Andrx entered into a licensing
agreement; or HMR entered into a licensing agreement with a third party.37 Andrx
also agreed to dismiss its counterclaims for unfair competition and antitrust viola-
tions and to pursue its ANDA claim. Finally, Andrx agreed not to relinquish or
transfer its 180-day exclusivity period or any other right. HMR agreed to pay An-
drx $40 million per year, beginning on the date that the FDA approved Andrx's
ANDA. HMR also agreed to pay Andrx $100 million per year, less the interim
$40 million payments, once there was either: a final judgment that the patent in
dispute, U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584 ("the '584 patent"), was not infringed; HMR
dismissed the patent infringement lawsuit; or the parties reached another resolu-
tion to their lawsuit. 39 In addition HMR agreed not to seek preliminary injunctive
relief during the ANDA suit.40 Two weeks later, Andrx began to market its gener-
ic product, starting the 180-day exclusivity period.41 This date of market entry was
almost 12 years before the expiration date of the '584 patent.
The agreement contained a number of provisions not found in other legal
agreements. For example, Andrx was the first generic company to file an ANDA,
and the agreement did not require the generic company to change its paragraph IV
certification.42 Since the parties settled the ANDA litigation, the 180-day exclu-
sivity period could not begin to run until Andrx entered the marketplace - a date
delayed by the agreement. 43 Moreover, the agreement contained a provision
wherein Andrx agreed neither to relinquish, nor transfer, its right to the exclusivity
period.44 In addition, the agreement purportedly covered generic Cardizem CD
products that did not satisfy the dissolution limitations in the patent claims, and
thus did not infringe the '584 patent.45
35. Id. at 902, 904. The active ingredient in Cardizem is diltiazem hydrochloride, used for treating
angina and hypertension and as a preventative for heart attack and stroke. U.S. Patent No. 5,470,584
(filed Feb. 27, 1995).
36. Id. at 903. ("On June 9, 1999, the FDA approved Andrx's reformulated product. That same day,
HMR and Andrx entered into a stipulation settling the patent infringement case and terminating the
Agreement. On June 23, 1999, Andrx began to market its product under the trademark Cartia XT, and
its 180-day period of marketing exclusivity began to run.").
37. Id. at 902.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 903. Which did not resolve the issues of invalidity, unenforceability, or infringement, and
HMR did not refile or pursue the lawsuit
40. Id. at 903.
41. Id.
42. See supra note 2 for an explanation of paragraph IV certification in an ANDA application.
43. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 903.
44. Id. at 902.
45. Id. at 915.
[Vol. 201456
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The antitrust lawsuit against HMR and Andrx was consolidated from several
complaints from individuals, states, and other groups.46 These complaints were
brought under Section 1 of the Sherman Act and § 4 of the Clayton Act. The
plaintiffs advanced a "but for" argument, that a generic Cardizem would have
been on the market absent the agreement, and that the exercise of its 180-day ex-
clusivity period barred other generics from coming to market.47 The district court
held the agreement was per se illegal, because the reverse payment provisions and
actual payments from HMR to Andrx delayed generic entry and constituted a
naked, horizontal restraint of trade. 48 The court certified an interlocutory appeal to
the Sixth Circuit on the question of whether the reverse payment settlement was
an antitrust violation. 49
In its opinion, the appellate court noted that while the literal meaning of Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act would render per se illegal every agreement in restraint
of trade, the Supreme Court has "long recognized" that the statute is meant only to
prohibit unreasonable restraints, and that courts assess whether a restraint is un-
reasonable using a rule of reason.50 To determine what constitutes an unreasonable
restraint of trade, the fact finder must consider several factors including 'specif-
ic information about the relevant business, its condition before and after the re-
straint was imposed, and the restraint's history, nature, and effect."' 51
However, there are some agreements that "have such predictable and perni-
cious anti-competitive effect[s], and such limited potential for pro-competitive
benefit," that they are considered incapable of satisfying the rule of reason under
any circumstances, 52 and are deemed per se illegal.53 Courts have recognized that
certain kinds of agreements cannot satisfy the rule of reason under any circum-
stances, and such agreements have a "conclusive presumption" of illegality. 54 For
such agreements, "no consideration is given to the intent behind the restraint, to
any claimed pro-competitive justifications, or to the restraint's actual effect on
46. Id. at 903.
47. Id. at 904. Plaintiffs fell into three groups: (1) the "State Law Class Plaintiffs," indirect purchas-
ers, and class representatives, from various states (California, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North
Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin and the District of Columbia) whose complaints, initially filed in
state court and then removed to federal district court by defendants, alleged violations of state antitrust
and consumer protection statutes; (2) the "Sherman Act Class Plaintiffs," direct purchasers, and class
representatives, whose complaint, filed in federal district court, alleged a violation of federal antitrust
law; and (3) the "Individual Sherman Act Plaintiffs," two groups of purchasers (filed by The Kroger
Co., Albertson's, Inc., The Stop and Shop Supermarket Co., and Eckerd Corp. and by CVS Meridian,
Inc. and Rite Aid Corp.), not representatives of any class, whose complaints, also filed in federal
district court, alleged violations of federal antitrust law; the plaintiffs from seven states (California,
Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Wisconsin) and the District of
Columbia claim violations of state antitrust law. Id. at n.8.
48. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 105 F. Supp. 2d 682, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
49. In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 900 (The court certified the following question
for interlocutory appeal to the 6th Circuit: "In determining whether Plaintiffs' motions for partial
judgment were properly granted, whether the Defendants' September 24, 1997 Agreement constitutes a
restraint of trade that is illegal per se under section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, and
under the corresponding state antitrust laws at issue in this litigation.").
50. Id. at 906 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
51. Id. (quoting State Oil, 522 U.S. at 10).
52. Id. (citing Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958)).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 906.
57
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competition."55 The Supreme Court is cited as being almost dismissive of such
instances: "a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify
them." 56 Citing the Nat'1 Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of
Oklahoma7 , the Sixth Circuit identified naked, horizontal price restraints as per se
illegal, pursuant to this line of Supreme Court precedent.
With this analytical framework in mind, the Sixth Circuit listed facts it termed
"undisputed and dispositive." 5 9 First, under the agreement, HMR was assured that
Andrx, its only potential competitor at the time, would remain out of the market at
a cost of $10 million per quarter, even after Andrx had obtained FDA approval for
its generic version of the drug.60 Second, as a consequence of this agreement,
Andrx and all other generic competitors were kept out of the market in view of
Andrx's 180-day exclusivity period, and Andrx's agreement not to relinquish or
transfer this right.61 Keeping the generic companies out of the market was enough
for the court to characterize the settlement agreement as a naked horizontal re-
straint that was per se illegal.62
The Sixth Circuit was not persuaded by the defendants' arguments to the con-
trary. Specifically, the court rejected defendants' argument that the agreement was
a proper exercise of the patent right.63 The court also determined that the plaintiffs
55. Id. (citing Nat'l Coll. Athletic Ass'n v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85,
100 (1984)).
56. Id. at 907.
57. 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984).
58. In re Cardizem CD AntitrustLitg., 332 F.3d at 9 0 7. The Supreme Court is cited as being almost
dismissive of such instances: "a per se rule reflects the judgment that such cases are not sufficiently
common or important to justify the time and expense necessary to identify them." Id. at 907 (quoting
Cont'l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 50 n.6 (1977)) (This type of agreement is defined
as "an agreement between competitors at the same level of the market structured to allocate territories
in order to minimize competition," stating that "[t]his Court has reiterated time and time again that
horizontal territorial limitations . . . are naked restraints of trade with no purpose except stifling of
competition. Such limitations are per se violations of the Sherman Act.").
59. Id.
60. Id. at 907.
61. Id. at 907-08 (which commenced only when Andrx first entered the marketplace; thus there was
a direct nexus between the agreement's provisions keeping Andrx off the market and the delay in
generic Cardizem coming to the marketplace from any source).
62. In re Cardizen CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d at 906 n. 11. (In a footnote, the court addressed the
consequences of a per se determination, instead of applying a rule of reason analysis:
The risk that the application of a per se rule will lead to the condemnation of an agreement that a
rule of reason analysis would permit has been recognized and tolerated as a necessary cost of this
approach. See, e.g., Arizona v. Maricopa Cty. Med. Soc., 457 U.S. 332, 344 (1982) ("As in every
rule of general application, the match between the presumed and the actual is imperfect. For the
sake of business certainty and litigation efficiency, we have tolerated the invalidation of some
agreements that a full-blown inquiry might have proved to be reasonable."); United States v.
Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 609 (1972) ("Whether or not we would decide this case the
same way under the rule of reason used by the District Court is irrelevant to the issue before
us.").
63. Id. at 908. ("[T]he Agreement cannot be fairly characterized as merely an attempt to enforce
patent rights or an interim settlement of the patent litigation.. As the plaintiffs point out, it is one thing
to take advantage of a monopoly that naturally arises from a patent, but another thing altogether to
bolster the patent's effectiveness in inhibiting competitors by paying the only potential competitor $40
million per year to stay out of the market.") And arguments that there were pro-competitive effects
that offset the anticompetitive effects were unavailing because of the court's determination that the
agreement was per se illegal.
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had sufficiently pled an antitrust injury.64 The consumers suffered the antitrust
injury because they "were deprived of a less expensive generic product, forcing
them to purchase the higher-priced brand name product, because of aper se illegal
horizontal market restraint." Preventing such an outcome was "undoubtedly a
raison d'etre" for passage of the Sherman Act.65 In addition, the injury "flows
from that which makes defendants act unlawful."66 The court found "incredible"
the argument that Andrx would not have entered the market, for fear of patent
infringement liability, in the absence of the $89 million paid by HMR under the
agreement. All of these considerations mitigated against the parties to the
agreement, which the court found to be illegal under the Sherman Act.
B. The Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits Apply the "Scope of the
patent" Test
The Eleventh Circuit came to a different conclusion than the Sixth Circuit on
the legality of reverse payment agreements.68 In Schering-Plough Corp. v. Feder-
al Trade Commission, the FTC issued a "cease and desist" order prohibiting
Schering-Plough from settling any patent infringement lawsuit with a generic drug
company where Schering-Plough gave the generic company "anything of value"
and "agree[d] to suspend research, development, manufacture, marketing, or sales
of [the generic] product." 69 The product at issue was an extended-release formula-
tion of a potassium supplement claimed in U.S. Patent No. 4,863,743. Schering-
Plough filed suit in response to Upsher-Smith Laboratories ("Upsher") ANDA
64. Id. at 909 (specifically (1) "injury ofthe type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent" and (2)
injury "that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlawful") (quoting Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977)). Part of the court's decision was based on the
standard of review, where all allegations in the complaint are taken as true and all inferences are drawn
in plaintiffs' favor. Id.
65. Id. at 910.
66. Id. at 911 (i.e., causing consumers to pay more for the branded drug than they would have paid
for Andrxs generic version).
67. Id. There are several distinctions that can be used to explain the different outcomes in this case
and the other cases that did not find a reverse payment agreement to be per se illegal. For example, in
the three cases that did not find an antitrust violation in a reverse payment agreement, discussed below,
the courts were careful to state that there were circumstances in which the agreement could be ille-
gal. These included an extension of the exclusionary right of the patent in excess of the proper scope
of the claims, initiation or continuance of "sham" litigation where the patentee knew that the patent
was invalid or unenforceable or that the accused product did not infringe the asserted claims, or Walker
Process-type violations. The court found that Andrx's reformulated product did not infringe the
claims of the '584 patent, and thus that payment from HMR to Andrx was not a legitimate exercise of
the patent's exclusionary right. Moreover, unlike other instances where the first ANDA filer changed
its certification from paragraph IV to paragraph III, and thus gave up its 180-day exclusivity period,
not only did Andrx not change its certification, but the reverse payment agreement contained an af-
firmative requirement that Andrx neither relinquish nor transfer the right. The effect of this provision
was to keep other potential generic entrants from the marketplace. Finally, while in other cases the
change in certification permitted other generic drug companies to file their own ANDAs and to thus be
able to obtain FDA approval (and in some of those cases that is precisely what occurred, although the
patentee sometimes prevailed and other generic companies did not enter the market), here the reverse
payment agreement had a preclusive effect on other potential generic entrants.
68. 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005).
69. Id. at 1057-58. The basis of the order was the Commission's determination that the settlement
agreement between Schering-Plough and Upsher Pharmaceuticals (containing a reverse payment) was
an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § I
and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
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filing on a generic version of Schering-Plough's formulation product, and the
parties settled before trial.70 The Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) hearing the case
in the first instance found both these agreements legal and dismissed the FTC
complaint."
The case was then heard by the full Commission, who reversed the AL. 72
The Commission backed off its initial position that reverse payment agreements
are per se illegal, but held that the quid pro quo of payment was for delayed ge-
neric market entry, which delay "would injure competition and consumers." The
Commission based its decision on generic market entry that "might have been"
agreed upon between the parties in the absence of payments.7 4 Although the
Commission could not tie the entry dates to the monetary compensation, it devel-
oped the rule that reverse payments were illegal, with an exception for litigation
costs to be capped at $2 million and a requirement that the FTC must be notified
of the existence and terms of the agreement.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, following its own precedent in Valley Drug
Co. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc.7 6 In Valley Drug Co. the Eleventh Circuit reversed the
district court's determination that this agreement was per se illegal, based on the
exclusionary powers of a patent. Patents, according to the court, intrinsically
distort the competitive landscape, and thus defeat a determination that the agree-
ment was per se illegal.
The FTC did not use a per se standard against Schering-Plough, however, but
instead applied a "rule of reason" analysis. The rule "tests 'whether the restraint
imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or
whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy competition."' 7 9 Here, the
Commission differed from the ALJ merely by showing "a detrimental market
effect," which the court characterized as "a low threshold" for making a finding of
antitrust liability.o The Eleventh Circuit stated that when patents are involved,
70. Id. The agreement contained a $60 million initial licensing fee, $10 million in milestone royalty
payments and 10-15% running royalties on five drugs owned by the generic company, including an
anti-cholesterol drug having an estimated net present value of $250 million. In addition, Upsher
agreed to a compromise date for market entry of it generic potassium product.
71. Id. at 1061-62. The ALJ's reasoning was that, unless the patent was invalid or the generic prod-
ucts did not infringe, the agreements were not violations of the antitrust laws. Significantly, the FTC
adduced no evidence before the ALl that these agreements were anything other than arm's-length
transactions between the parties. The ALl found that the FTC did not prove that, without the payment,
either a better settlement agreement or litigation would have resulted in earlier generic market entry.
72. Id. at 1062.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. A requirement adopted in the 2003 Medicare Prescription Drug Improvement and Moderni-
zation Act.
76. 344 F.3d 1294, 1303-04 (11th Cir. 2003).
77. Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1312-13.
78. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1064 ("In the context of patent litigation ... the anticompetitive
effect may be no more broad than the patent's own exclusionary power. To expose those agreements
to antitrust liability would 'obviously chill such settlements') (quoting Valley Drugs, 344 F.3d at
1309).
79. Id. (citing FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 457 (1986)).
80. Id. at 1065.
Thus, under the Commission's standard, once the FTC met the low threshold of demonstrating
the anticompetitive nature of the agreements, it found that Schering and Upsher did not suffi-
ciently establish that the challenged activities were justified by procompetitive benefits. Despite
the appearance that it openly considered Schering and Upsher's procompetitive affirmative de-
[Vol. 201460
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neither per se illegality nor a rule of reason analysis is appropriate in assessing
antitrust liability, "because they seek to determine whether the challenged conduct
had an anticompetitive effect on the market."" The court stated that it is the legit-
imate exclusionary power of the patent that the court said must be considered in
making an antitrust determination.8 Following Valley Drug, the court announced
that "the proper analysis of antitrust liability requires an examination of: (1) the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to which the
agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive effects."83
Turning to the patent at issue and the agreement between the parties, the court
noted that the FTC's characterization of the agreements as linking the payments to
the delayed market entry was not supported by substantial evidence. 84 In fact, the
court found that the evidence before the ALJ was directly contrary to the FTC's
position -- that the reverse payment was "a bona fide fair-value payment" for
rights to market these drugs.85
Regarding allegations that the agreement violated the FTC Act, and whether
the agreements represented an "unfair method of competition," the court said that
there must be an actual anticompetitive effect, not one that is "hypothetical or
presumed." 86 Interestingly, the Court opined that the certainty resulting from the
settlement would lead to "more intense competition."87 Citing Valley Drug, the
Court advanced the idea that litigation can be a more costly means to achieve the
same exclusion reached by settlement, contrary to the "logic" employed by the
Commission that payment was merely a quid pro quo for delayed generic market
entry.88
The court's opinion also notes that under typical infringement situations,
Schering would be entitled to lost profits damages for Upsher and ESI entering the
marketplace. 89 Hatch-Waxman "essentially redistributes the relative risk assess-
fense, the Commission immediately condemned the settlements because of their absolute anti-
competitive nature, and discounted the merits of the patent litigation. It would seem as though
the Commission clearly made its decision before it considered any contrary conclusion.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 1067 ("Although the exclusionary power of a patent may seem incongruous with the goals
of antitrust law, a delicate balance must be drawn between the two regulatory schemes. Indeed, appli-
cation of antitrust law to markets affected by the exclusionary statutes set forth in patent law cannot
discount the rights of the patent holder. Simpson v. Union Oil Co., 337 U.S. 13, 14 (1964) (Patent laws
'are in pari materia' with the antitrust laws and modify them pro tanto (as far as the patent laws go)").
83. Id. at 1066.
84. Id. at 1071. Indeed, in the proceedings before the ALJ, FTC counsel "acknowledged that it
could not prove that Upsher [and ESI, another generic entrant] could have entered the market on their
own prior to the '743 patent's expiration on September 5, 2006. This reinforces the validity and
strength of the patent." Id. at 1068.
85. Id. at 1069.
86. Id. at 1072 ("By contrast, ... the Hatch-Waxman Amendments grant generic manufacturers
standing to mount a validity challenge without incurring the cost of entry or risking enormous damages
flowing from" any possible infringement. See In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation,
261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 251 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). Id. at 1074.
87. Id. at 1073.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 1073-74 ("It is uncontested that parties settle cases based on their perceived risk of pre-
vailing in and losing the litigation. Pre-Hatch-Waxman, Upsher and ESI normally would have had to
enter the market with their products, incurring the costs of clinical trials, manufacturing and marketing.
This market entry would have driven down Schering's profits, as it took sales away. As a result, Scher-
ing would have sued ESI and Upsher, seeking damages for lost profits and willful infringement. As-
suming the patent is reasonably strong, and the parties then settled under this scenario, the money most
61
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ments." 90 Because of the Hatch-Waxman scheme, ESI and Upsher gained consid-
erable leverage in patent litigation. Their exposure to liability amounted to noth-
ing more than litigation costs, but paled in comparison to the immense volume of
generic sales and resulting profits. 91
Following this line of reasoning, the court posed a "pre-Hatch-Waxman" hy-
pothetical regarding settlement of a similar lawsuit, wherein if the patent-holder
settled for less than the damages it was entitled to, the "windfall" garnered by the
generic would be like the reverse payment here (since presumably the settlement
would effect a delay in generic market entry). 92 And looking long-term, the court
posited that a ban on reverse payments would remove the incentive for settlement,
and in some percentage of cases, the patentee would prevail, thus delaying generic
market entry even longer.93 Accordingly, the court stated that the anticompetitive
cost to consumers of the Hatch-Waxman litigation needs to be considered.94
Finally, the court posited that the caustic environment of patent litigation may
actually decrease product innovation by amplifying the period of uncertainty
around the drug manufacturer's ability to research, develop, and market the pa-
tented product or allegedly infringing product. 95 According to the court, the inten-
sified guesswork involved with lengthy litigation cuts against the benefits pro-
posed by a rule that forecloses a patentee's ability to settle its infringement
claim.96 Similarly, Hatch-Waxman settlements, like the ones at issue in this case,
(which resulted in the patentee's purchase of a license for some of the alleged
infringer's other products) may benefit the public by introducing a new rival into
the market, facilitating competitive production, and encouraging further innova-
tion.
The Second Circuit in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, agreed
with the Eleventh Circuit's analysis in Schering-Plough.97 In In re Tamoxifen, the
FTC sued a number of related companies98 and Barr Pharmaceuticals over a set-
tlement agreement of ANDA litigation regarding the breast cancer drug tamoxi-
fen.99 The district court in the underlying ANDA litigation found the patent inva-
probably would flow from the infringers to Schering because the generics would have put their com-
panies at risk by making infringing sales.").
90. Id.
91. Id. ("By entering into the settlement agreements, Schering realized the full potential of its in-
fringement suit -- a determination that the '743 patent was valid and that ESI and Upsher would not
infringe the patent in the future. Furthermore, although ESI and Upsher obtained less than what they
would have received from successfully defending the lawsuits (the ability to immediately market their
generics), they gained more than if they had lost. A conceivable compromise, then, directs the consid-
eration from the patent owner to the challengers. . . . Ultimately, the consideration paid to Upsher and
ESI was arguably less than if Schering's patent had been invalidated, which would have resulted in the
generic entry of potassium chloride supplements.").
92. Schering-Plough, 402 F.3d at 1074.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1075.
95. Id.
96. Id. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 133 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)
(noting that the settlement resolved the parties' complex patent litigation, and in so doing, "cleared the
field" for other ANDA filers).
97. See In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006).
98. Id. (Collectively designated "Zeneca").
99. Id. The reverse payment amounted to $21 million and an agreement between the companies
wherein Barr became the source of an "authorized generic" version of the drug, i.e., that Zeneca would
act as a supplier of tamoxifen for Barr to be resold in the U.S. at a price higher than would typically
occur when a generic version of a drug enters the marketplace.
[Vol. 201462
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lid, and the parties' agreement was contingent on getting a vacatur of this judg-
ment.100 While this judgment was being appealed to the Federal Circuit, the par-
ties settled. 101
In the district court case brought by plaintiffs and the FTC, the court dis-
missed the complaint based on the existence of a patent; 102 the district court held
that only by misusing a patent can the patentee be liable for an antitrust viola-
tion. 103 The district court suggested that a reverse payment merely to keep a gener-
ic drug off the market might have a different character than an agreement, as here,
which settles active litigation.10 Additionally, Barr's petition to extend its 180-
day exclusivity period was also not illegal, being exempt from antitrust liability
under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine. 0 5
Although the Second Circuit recognized that there are competing legal prin-
ciples between consumer protection under the antitrust law and the exclusivity
conferred to patentees under patent law,106 the court did not believe that a ban on
reverse payments was the answer. 10' Instead, the court reviewed the antitrust alle-
gations before it on the merits. The first allegation discussed in the opinion was
that the district court should have considered the patent presumptively invalid
based on the earlier determination of invalidity. 10 The court rejected this view,
saying that the established principle is that courts should encourage settlement in
the public interest. 109 The court was unwilling to presume that the Federal Circuit
would have affirmed the district court's invalidity determination if that determina-
tion had been reviewed in an appeal of the underlying ANDA litigation.1 10
Secondly, the court found that the timing of the settlement agreement -- after
an invalidity decision in the ANDA litigation -- was irrelevant, saying that both
100. Id. at 190-94. The basis for the District Court's invalidity decision was non-disclosure of mate-
rial prior art. Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Barr Laboratories, 795 F. Supp. 619, 626 (S.D.N.Y.
1992), vacated pursuant to settlement sub nom. Imperial Chem. Indus., PLC v. Heumann Pharma
GmbH & Co., 991 F.2d 811 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
101. Id. at 190.
102. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (E.D.N.Y. 2003) affd, 466
F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006). See U.S. Patent No. 4,536,516.
103. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 124. An additional fact relevant to
the District Court's later-vacated decision was that Barr, the first ANDA filer, re-asserted its 180-day
data exclusivity period that prevented other generics that were preparing to enter the market. Prior to
Barr's action, several other generic companies filed ANDAs and Zeneca prevailed in all of these law-
suits. The FDA permitted Barr to recoup its 180-day exclusivity period, which was subsequently
challenged and overturned by the District Court. The FTC's position was that the settlement agree-
ment amounted to "reviving" an invalid patent, continuing Zeneca's "monopoly" over tamoxifen,
prevented other generics from entering the marketplace, maintained a high price on tamoxifen, and
amounted to the companies "sharing.. unlawful monopoly profits." In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust
Litig.,.466 F.3d at 196-97.
104. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 277 F. Supp. 2d at 133.
105. Specifically, the court held that regulatory agency action, taken or petitioned in good faith, does
not raise antitrust injury if it is "the result of the legal monopoly that a patent holder possesses." Id. at
138. Moreover, "forcing" other ANDA filers to "prove" that the patent was invalid was not an antitrust
injury, particularly since Zeneca prevailed in these actions (implying that the patents were not invalid).
Id. at 137.
106. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 202.
107. Id. at 202-05.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 202.
110. Id. at 203.
63
13
Noonan: Intersection of Patent Infringement and Antitrust Liability in Ab
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2014
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
parties had reason to settle before having the decision reviewed by the Federal
Circuit.1
Third, plaintiffs and the FTC contended that the amount of the reverse pay-
ment greatly exceeded the value of the settlement even under a "best case scenar-
io."112 The court expressly refused to hold that a reverse payment is a per se anti-
trust violation." Indeed, the court said that the Hatch-Waxman regime encour-
ages settlements having reverse payments, because the statute reverses the usual
positions of the parties.11 4 Indeed the court went further, viewing reverse pay-
ments as expected consequences of the incentives created under the Hatch-
Waxman system. 1 5
The Second Circuit also said that "excessive" reverse payments could be a
violation if merely "a device for circumventing antitrust law."116 The court recog-
nized that "at first blush," a reverse payment may look per se anticompetitive, but
said that "upon reflection" suspicion abates "so long as the patent litigation is
neither a sham nor otherwise baseless." 1 Under the circumstances in this case,
settlements are a way to protect what the patentee is lawfully entitled to -- exclu-
sivity." The court went on to say that a rule that would penalize a patentee for
settling a lawsuit neglects to consider that there is always a risk that a court will
invalidate a patent, and that a patentee might legitimately decide to insure against
that risk by settling.1 19
The court termed "unrealistic ... the possibility that the patent holder will
continue to buy out potential competition such that a settlement with one generic
manufacturer protecting the patent holder's ill-gotten patent monopoly will be
followed by other settlements with other generic manufacturers should a second,
third, and fourth rise to challenge the patent" because "[e]very settlement payment
to a generic manufacturer reduces the profitability of the patent monopoly. [I]t is
unlikely that the holder of a weak patent could stave off all possible challengers
with exclusion payments because the economics simply would not justify it." 120
The court considered the alternative advocated by the FTC, holding these
agreements to be presumptively unlawful, and rejected it:
111. Id. at 204 (noting that "it takes no citation to authority to conclude that appellants prevail with
some frequency in federal courts of appeals even when a high degree of deference is accorded the
district courts from which the appeals are taken.").
112. Id. at 205.
113. Id. at 206.
114. Id. Typically in patent litigation, according to the court, the risk is with the accused infringer
(the generic drug maker), who must develop the competing generic drug, obtain approval, and then
enter the marketplace "at risk" of patent infringement litigation. The provisions of Hatch-Waxman
changed this calculus, the court opined, because the generic drug maker does not need to expend very
much of its resources in developing its ANDA. As a consequence, in the court's view, the generic
drug maker has relatively "little to lose" in ANDA litigation. Id. at 207. The situation of the generic
drug maker is in contrast to the patentee, who has lost the possibility of damages from the generic drug
maker and can, at best, effectively obtain an injunction (either from the court or by the refusal of the
FDA to provide regulatory approval until its Orange Book-listed patent(s) expire). The patentee's
incentive is to prevent infringement, and a patentee may be willing to reach this result even if it needs
to incur certain costs in the short term (i.e., reverse payments).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 208.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 211.
119. Id.
120. In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d at 212.
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But such a requirement would be contrary to well-established principles
of law. As we have rehearsed at some length above, settlement of patent
litigation is not only suffered, it is encouraged for a variety of reasons
even if it leads in some cases to the survival of monopolies created by
what would otherwise be fatally weak patents. It is too late in the jour-
ney for us to alter course.121
Finally, while the court was "not so sure" that Barr's later attempts to recover
its 180-day exclusivity period as the first ANDA filer were immune from antitrust
considerations under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, the scope of the anticompeti-
tive aspects of the agreement was not illegally excessive, and the court could dis-
cern no antitrust injury.122
Once again, a circuit court rejected the FTC's call for a substantially per se
determination that reverse payments are illegal and should be banned in all cir-
cumstances after carefully considering the agreement as a whole.
In 2010, the Second Circuit in Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund
v. Bayer AG, followed its ownl2 and the Eleventh Circuit's1 24 precedent1 25 by
ruling that the reverse payment settlement agreement, between defendants Bayer
AG and several generic drug makers, 12 6 was not illegal under U.S. antitrust law
and prevailing precedent. 127
Arkansas Carpenters Health involved the antibiotic Cipro, to which Bayer
AG held the patent. 12 The case arose when antitrust plaintiffs appealed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment for the ANDA settlement party defend-
ants. The district court concluded that defendants did not violate Section 1 of the
Sherman Act in settling its patent infringement litigation with a "reverse exclu-
sionary payment" settlement. 129 The terms of the reverse settlement agreement
121. Id. The court also considered the terms of the agreement, specifically whether the exclusionary
terms of the agreement exceeded the scope of the patent protection -- i.e., to enlarge the patent
right. The answer here is that it did not, in part because the patent at issue was to a composition rather
than a formulation. Under these circumstances, the patent scope was broader and the exclusionary
right accordingly more expansive. In addition, the court noted that, unlike other instances of reverse
payments, there was no generic bottleneck, since several other generic companies filed ANDAs on
Zeneca's drug. And Barr entered the market under license, so there was competition in the market-
place (albeit as an "authorized generic" that sold for about 5% less than the branded).
122. Id. at 217-18.
123. See supra text accompanying notes 97-122.
124. See supra text accompanying notes 68-96.
125. See Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG., 604 F.3d 98, 104-06 (2d Cir.
2010).
126. Including The Rugby Group, Watson Pharmaceuticals Inc., and Barr Laboratories Inc. Arkansas
Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 100.
127. Id. at 106-110.
128. Id. at 100.
129. Id. at 104-10. As the consolidated case name indicates, the drug at issue was ciprofloxacin (or
"Cipro"), a patented U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 antibiotic owned by Bayer. Id. at 100. The other
defendants were generic drug makers capable of making generic versions of Cipro who had filed
ANDAs with the FDA to obtain regulatory approval for selling generic Cipro. Id. at 100-01. Under the
provisions of the Hatch-Waxman Act, Bayer sued each of these generic drug makers to block FDA
approval until the conclusion of the patent litigation. Id. at 101. The court recognized that "the Hatch-
Waxman Act redistributes the relative risks between the patent holder and the generic manufacturer,
allowing generic manufacturers to challenge the validity of the patent without incurring the costs of
market entry or the risks of damages from infringement." Id. The panel's opinion cited the earlier
determination that such "reverse payments" were not illegal in In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.,
15
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between Bayer and Barr, the first ANDA filer, required Bayer to pay Barr $398.1
million, 13 0 and guarantee that the generic manufacturers could sell "brand name"
Cipro, for six months prior to the expiration date of the patent.13 ' Bayer received
Barr's promise, and the promise of the other generic manufacturers, not to enter
the marketplace with a generic version of Cipro, and concessions regarding the
validity and enforceability of the patent, ending the ANDA lawsuit. 132 Barr "re-
served its right to reinstate its ANDA-IV [lawsuit] if Bayer's patent were later
held to be invalid."133 Bayer's patent was later challenged by four different gener-
ic manufacturers, 134 none were successful. 135
Plaintiffs responded to the reverse payment agreement by filing more than
thirty antitrust lawsuits, which were consolidated for trial before the district court
granted defendants' summary judgment motion. 136 The court expressly rejected a
"post hoc determination of the potential validity" vel non of U.S. Patent No.
4,670,444 ("the '444 patent'), which would be contrary to the statutory presump-
tion of validity and "would work a revolution in patent law."1 3' Further, the dis-
trict court stated that "in the absence of any evidence that the Agreements created
a bottleneck on challenges to the '444 Patent, or that they otherwise restrained
competition beyond the scope of the claims of the '444 Patent, the Agreements
have not had any anti-competitive effects on the market for ciprofloxacin beyond
that which are permitted under the '444 Patent. The district court reasoned
that there is no requirement that ANDA litigants are required to consider the pub-
lic's interest in low-cost generic drugs, and such a rule would undermine "well-
settled principles of patent law." 139 Finally, the district court noted that attempting
to quantify the value of the public's interest in low cost drugs in these settlement
agreements would contravene patents' presumption of validity and impact patent
licensing in other transactions.140
466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006) abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 186 L. Ed. 2d 343
(U.S. 2013). Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 105.
130. Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 110 n.8. A $49.1 million lump sum, and quarterly payments
between $12.5 million and $17.125 million until six months prior to patent expiry. Id. at 102.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 102 n.9.
134. Id. "Four generic manufacturers-Ranbaxy, Schein, Mylan, and Carlsbad subsequently chal-
lenged the Cipro patent." Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 102-03. The panel quoted from the district court opinion:
The ultimate question - and this is the crux of the matter - is not whether Bayer and Barr had the
power to adversely affect competition for ciprofloxacin as a whole, but whether any adverse ef-
fects on competition stemming from the Agreements were outside the exclusionary zone of the
'444 Patent. It goes without saying that patents have adverse effects on competition. However,
any adverse effects within the scope of a patent cannot be redressed by antitrust law.
Id.
137. Id. at 103 (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 529
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) affd in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (U.S. 2013) and affd in part sub nom. Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010)).
138. Id. (quoting In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 363 F. Supp. 2d 514, 540
(E.D.N.Y. 2005) affd in part, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008) abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (U.S. 2013) and affd in part sub nom. Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d 98 (2d Cir. 2010)).
139. Id.
140. 604 F.3d 98, 102. In an interesting footnote, the Second Circuit explained that the "indirect
purchaser plaintiffs" had included "Walker Process" antitrust claims, based on the willful assertion of
an unenforceable patent, pursuant to Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp. 382
[Vol. 201466
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The Second Circuit analyzed defendants' behavior in the context of the
Sherman Act prohibitions, informed by the opinions of other Circuit Courts of
Appeal 41 as well as the Federal Trade Commission's arguments that reverse pay-
ment arrangements are per se illegal restraints of trade.1 42 The court noted that
"[a]uthorities are divided on this question."1 43 Notably, while academic commen-
tators and FTC economists take the per se illegal view, most courts have applied
the "rule of reason" and held that such agreements are not sufficiently anticompet-
itive to establish antitrust liability.1 "
The Second Circuit noted that it is bound by its Circuit's precedent 45 and ap-
plied the "rule of reason" test to the facts. The court noted that there were no
allegations that Bayer's '444 patent was a sham or that Bayer procured it by
fraud. 146 The court said that "the only reasonable basis for distinguishing Tamoxi-
fen would be if plaintiffs demonstrated that the settlement agreement here, unlike
in Tamoxifen, exceeded the scope of the Cipro patent," 147 which plaintiffs could
not do. Since a generic version of Cipro would "necessarily infringe" the '444
patent, the exercise of the patent to exclude generic Cipro was precisely within the
scope of the patent's exclusionary right.148 And while plaintiffs argued, on appeal,
that the settlement agreement involved or permitted "manipulation" of the 180-
day exclusivity period and precluded subsequent ANDA paragraph IV challenges,
no evidence supported these allegations. 149 The court noted that Barr forfeited its
U.S. 172, 177 (1965). Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 110 n.10. Transfer was necessary because
Walker Process claims "arise under" U.S. patent law and are thus within the exclusive province of the
Federal Circuit. Id. That Court affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment for defend-
ants. Id. (citing In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed. Cir.
2008) abrogated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (U.S. 2013)).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 97-141.
142. See Kevin E. Noonan, FTC Disapproves of Pay-for-Delay' Drug Deals, PATENTDOCS (Feb. 15,
2010), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/02/ftc-disapproves-of-payfordelay-drug-deals.html.
143. Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 105
144. See Kevin E. Noonan, Reverse Payments in Generic Drug Settlements - Part I, Part II, Part III_),
PATENTDOCS (Feb. 22-23, 25, 2010)), http://www.patentdocs.org/2010/02/reverse-payments-in-
generic-drug-settlements.html. The most relevant of these judicial determinations finding no antitrust
liability is Joblove v. Barr Labs. Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187, 216 (2d
Cir. 2006), being binding precedent on the court. In that case, the Second Circuit panel determined as
a matter of law that the reverse-payment agreement was not anticompetitive to a degree that raised
antitrust liability. Id. Here, the panel noted the similarities between the Tamoxifen court's reasoning
and the analysis supplied by the district court; in Tamoxifen the court said:
Unless and until the patent is shown to have been procured by fraud, or a suit for its enforcement
is shown to be objectively baseless, there is no injury to the market cognizable under existing an-
titrust law, as long as competition is restrained only within the scope of the patent.
Arkansas Carpenters, 604 F.3d at 106 (quoting In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 466 F.3d
at 213). Under the Tamoxifen precedent, there is a three-prong test for determining that a reverse
payment agreement is legal: "where (1) there was no restriction on marketing noninfringing products;
(2) a generic version of the branded drug would necessarily infringe the branded firm's patent; and (3)
the agreement did not bar other generic manufacturers from challenging the patent." Id.
145. 604 F.3d at 106.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. In this regard the court distinguished so-called "formulation patents," which are limited to
certain formulations of an active pharmaceutical ingredient, with "compound patents" (such as the
'444 patent), which encompass all formulations of a drug.
149. Id.
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180-day exclusivity period under the law, which required the ANDA filer to pre-
vail in litigation invalidating an Orange Book-listed patent.5 o
However, the court also noted that the "practice of entering into reverse ex-
clusionary payment settlements has increased" since the Tamoxifen decision.5
Also significant for the panel were remarks from Senator Orrin Hatch to the effect
that he found reverse payment provisions "appalling."152 Finally, and perhaps
most significantly, the court considered the Tamoxifen decision to have been
based on "an erroneous characterization" of the law, specifically that the 180-day
exclusivity period would be ceded by the first ANDA filer upon entering into a
reverse payment-containing settlement of ANDA litigation.' While calling for a
reconsideration of the Tamoxifen precedent by the court en banc, the panel fol-
lowed precedent and affirmed the district court's decision that the agreement did
not violate the antitrust laws.154
The Federal Circuit followed this trend of rejecting the FTC's view on re-
verse payment agreements in In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litiga-
tion.1 55 In this case, several unions and other patient groups, as well as individual
patients, sued defendants, including Bayer AG & Bayer Corp., Hoechst Marion
Roussel, Watson Pharmaceuticals, and Barr Labs. Plaintiffs' claims involved
ciprofloxacin hydrochloride ("Cipro"), Bayer's product, for which Barr was the
first ANDA filer. 156 Litigation pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) of the Hatch-
Waxman Act ensued and the parties settled.157
Plaintiffs alleged antitrust violations under Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act, illegal contracts in restraint of trade, and claims under state antitrust and con-
sumer protection laws. Later, plaintiffs added a Walker Process claim.158 Howev-
er, the district court granted summary judgment against the plaintiffs, holding that
any anticompetitive effects "were within the exclusionary zone of [the patent]."159
The court's decision was based on a rule of reason analysis that did not get past
150. Id. at 107.
151. 604 F.3d at 109. Fourteen settlements prior to the Tamoxifen decision, none of which contained
reverse payment provisions, compared with 27 settlements after the decision, in which 20 contained
reverse payment provisions. It should be noted that these data were gleaned from amicus briefs arguing
against the legality of reverse-payment provisions in settlement agreements. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. The panel's sentiments, noted above, were obvious in its conclusion:
In sum, as long as Tamoxifen is controlling law, plaintiffs' claims cannot survive. Accordingly,
we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. However, we believe there are compelling rea-
sons to revisit Tamoxifen with the benefit of the full Court's consideration of the difficult ques-
tions at issue and the important interests at stake. We therefore invite the plaintiffs-appellants to
petition for rehearing in banc.
Id. at 110.
154. Id.
155. 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
156. U.S. Patent No. 4,670,444 (filed May 29, 1984).
157. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation, 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008). Under
the terms of the settlement agreement, defendants agreed not to challenge the validity or enforceability
of the patent, and Barr would convert its paragraph IV certification to a Paragraph III (agreeing not to
enter the market until the patent expired). The reverse payment from Bayer to Barr totaled $398.1
million. Bayer also agreed to make quarterly "reverse payments" or supply Barr with Cipro for resale
until after the patent expired. Id. at 1328-29 & n.5.
158. Id. at 1329 (despite the fact that the patent had been through a re-exam with a claim specific to
ciprofloxacin hydrochloride exiting unamended).
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the first step: any anti-competitive effects fell within the ambit of the patent exclu-
sionary right and hence were not illegal.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed. 160 The panel reviewed the judgment
de novo on all issues.1 61 The plaintiffs asserted five points of error: (1) the agree-
ment was per se illegal, or illegal under a proper application of the rule of reason;
(2) the agreement improperly extended the exclusionary zone of patent; (3) the
district court should have considered the law of regional circuits and government
agencies (FTC); (4) that the District Court should have considered the effects of
these kinds of agreements on other generic entrants; and, (5) the effects on compe-
tition of Barr's 180-day exclusivity period. 162
As to the first asserted point of error, the court reminded the plaintiffs that the
Supreme Court has not interpreted the Sherman Act as prohibiting all agreements
in restraint of trade, just those that constitute unreasonable restraints.1 63 The Fed-
eral Circuit found no basis for finding the agreement per se illegal and instead
applied the Second Circuit's analysis. 164 Judge Prost opined that "there was no
evidence that the Agreements created a bottleneck on challenges to the patent or
otherwise restrained competition outside the 'exclusionary zone' of the patent." 165
The second allegation of error was that the settlement agreement improperly
extended the exclusionary scope of the patent. The Federal Circuit considered
plaintiffs' argument,166 but noted that the district court had cited many Supreme
Court and Courts of Appeals holdings that "any adverse anti-competitive effects
within the scope of the patent could not be redressed by antitrust law." 167 The
Federal Circuit concluded that the purpose of Bayer's ANDA agreement was to
"exclude the defendants from profiting from the patented invention," as was
Bayer's right, as the patentee of the drug.1 68  The court explained that
"[s]ettlement of patent claims by agreement between the parties - including ex-
change of consideration - rather than by litigation is not precluded by the Sher-
man Act even though it may have some adverse effects on competition."1 69 Of
special importance to this decision is the court's discounting the allegation that the
settlements hinder challenges to the patent, in view of the fact that four other ge-
neric manufacturers had challenged the patent after the settlement at issue.170
160. 544 F.3d 1323. The opinion was written by Judge Prost, joined by Judge Schall and Judge Ward,
District Judge for the Eastern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Id.
161. Id. at 1330-31.
162. Id. at 1331. The two final arguments raised on appeal were that the district court should have
considered the effects of these kinds of agreements on other generic entrants, and the court should have
considered the effect of Barr's 180-day exclusivity period on competition. Id.
163. Id. at 1331-32 ("Only agreements that have a 'predictable and pernicious anticompetitive effect,
and . . . limited potential for procompetitive benefit' are deemed to be per se unlawful under the Sher-
man Act." (quoting State Oil Co. v. Khan., 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997))).
164. 544 F.3d 1332.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1332-33.
167. Id. at 1333 ("This is because a patent by its very nature is anticompetitive; it is a grant to the
inventor of 'the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention,"'
(quoting U.S. Patent Act 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2014))) and concluding "[t]hus, 'a patent is an excep-
tion to the general rule against monopolies and to the right of access to a free and open market."'
(quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 816 (1945))).
168. Id.
169. Id. (quoting Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 & n.5 (1931)).
170. Id. at 1338.
69
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The court declined plaintiffs' invitation to apply the legal opinions of other
regional circuits, administrative agencies or legal commentators such as the Sixth
Circuit decision in In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation,1 7 1 and the FTC's posi-
tion that reverse payments should be per se illegal.172 The court also distinguished
the Sixth Circuit's decision that reverse payment agreements were per se illegal,
"because the court failed to consider the exclusionary power of the patent in its
antitrust analysis."
The Federal Circuit turned instead to decisions from the Eleventh1 74 and Sec-
ond Circuits. 17  These circuits share the Federal Circuit's approach that antitrust
violations occur in ANDA reverse payment agreements when the patent is invalid
or unenforceable due to inequitable conduct, or when the litigation is a sham. 17 6
The Federal Circuit also opined that, absent fraud on the U.S. Patent & Trademark
Office during patent prosecution or sham litigation, patent validity does not need
to be considered in a rule of reason analysis,177 due to the rule's presumption of
validity.1 71
The last of the series of negative judicial responses to the FTC's position
came in the Eleventh Circuit's 2012 decision in Federal Trade Commission v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals, which reaffirmed the holding of Schering-Plough, Inc.
171. 332 F.3d 896 (6th Cir. 2003).
172. In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 544 F.3d 1323, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2008) abro-
gated by F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 186 L. Ed. 2d 343 (U.S. 2013):
In [the District Court's rule of reason] analysis, it considered whether there was evidence of
sham litigation or fraud before the PTO, and whether any anticompetitive effects of the Agree-
ments were outside the exclusionary zone of the patent. The application of a rule of reason analy-
sis to a settlement agreement involving an exclusion payment in the Hatch-Waxman context has
been embraced by the Second Circuit, and advocated by the FTC and the Solicitor General. And,
although the Sixth Circuit found a per se violation of the antitrust laws in In re Cardizem, the
facts of that case are distinguishable from this case and from the other circuit court decisions. In
particular, the settlement in that case included, in addition to a reverse payment, an agreement by
the generic manufacturer to not relinquish its 180-day exclusivity period, thereby delaying the
entry of other generic manufacturers. In re Cardizem. Furthermore, th[at] agreement provided
that the generic manufacturer would not market non-infringing versions of the generic drug. Id.
at 908 n.13. Thus, th[at] agreement clearly had anti-competitive effects outside the exclusion
zone of the patent... To the extent that the Sixth Circuit may have found a per se antitrust viola-
tion based solely on the reverse payments, we respectfully disagree (citations omitted).
173. Id. at 1335.
174. Id. at 1335-36.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1336. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 175-
77 (1965) (holding that there may be a violation of the Sherman Act when a patent is procured by
fraud, but recognizing that a patent is an exception to the general rule against monopolies).
177. Id. at 1336-37 (quoting In re Schering-Plough Corp., No. 9297, 2003 WL 22989651, slip op. at
19 (F.T.C. Dec. 8, 2003)). Ironically, citing an FTC position to this effect: "it would not be necessary,
practical, or particularly useful for the Commission to embark on an inquiry into the merits of the
underlying patent dispute when resolving antitrust issues in patent settlements." It seems, however,
that the FTC has changed its position on this point, because it argued that the "expected value" of the
lawsuit at the time of settlement be considered in the rule of reason antitrust analysis. Id. at 1337.
178. Id. "[T]he district court correctly concluded that there is no legal basis for restricting the right of
a patentee to choose its preferred means of enforcement and no support for the notion that the Hatch-
Waxman Act was intended to thwart settlements." Even Circuit Court Judge Richard Posner, a leader
in the "law and economics" movement, seems to agree: "As Judge Posner [has] remarked, if "there is
nothing suspicious about the circumstances of a patent settlement, then to prevent a cloud from being
cast over the settlement process a third party should not be permitted to haul the parties to the settle-
ment over the hot coals of antitrust litigation." Asahi Glass Co. v. Pentech Pharms., Inc., 289 F. Supp.
2d 986, 992 (N.D. Ill. 2003).
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et al.1 7 9 The case involved a reverse payment settlement between New Drug Ap-
plication (NDA) holder Solvay Pharmaceuticals and ANDA filers Watson Phar-
maceuticals and Paddock Pharmaceuticals over AndroGel, a prescription testos-
terone formulation prescribed for treating hypogonadism.so Watson and Paddock
filed separate ANDAs having paragraph IV certifications that Solvay's patent was
invalid or unenforceable, and Solvay timely filed suit.' The parties settled before
the court ruled on defendants' summary judgment motions, after a Markman hear-
ing.
The appeal arose pursuant to an investigation by the FTC of the parties' set-
tlement agreements,18 wherein the FTC alleged violations of Section 5a of the
Federal Trade Commission Act.8 The district court granted defendants' motion
to dismiss explaining that, in the Eleventh Circuit, reverse payments did not con-
stitute anticompetitive behavior if "the terms of the settlement remain[ed] within
the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent."184
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's holding.
From the outset the court's opinion showed little patience with the FTC's theories,
explaining that new drugs are produced in the U.S. under the maxims "no risk, no
reward" and "more risk, more reward," and that "[n]o rational actor ... would take
[the] risk" of investing more than "$1.3 billion" on a potential drug, in an industry
where "[o]nly one of every 5,000 medicines tested ... is eventually approved for
patient use . . . without the prospect of a big reward."'1 5 Under this system, the
court recognized that the successful drug maker who patents its drug will "usual-
ly... recoup its investment and gain a profit, sometimes a super-sized one."1 86 The
court also noted that "more money, more problems" result, and that profits "fre-
quently attract competitors in the form of generic drug manufacturers that chal-
lenge or try to circumvent the pioneer's monopoly in the market." 87
The court returned to its previously stated analysis of the FTC's position, stat-
ing that "[t]he lynchpin of the FTC's complaint is its allegation that Solvay proba-
bly would have lost the underlying patent infringement action" and that "Solvay
179. F.T.C. v. Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2012) cert. granted, 133 S. Ct. 787
(U.S. 2012) and rev'd and remanded sub nom. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (U.S. 2013)
(The "et al." included the ANDA filer, Paddock Pharmaceuticals, and its licensee, Par Pharmaceuti-
cals).
180. Id. at 1304-05. Unimed (acquired by Solvay and later acquired by Abbott) and Besins
Healthcare S.A. held the NDA, as well as Orange Book-listed U.S. Patent No. 6,503,894 directed to
the formulation; this patent will expire in August 2020. Id. at 1304.
181. Id. at 1303-04 (pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2) in the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Georgia).
182. Id. at 1305 (pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 355 (2003)).
183. Id. (pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)).
184. Id. at 1306 (pursuant to FED. R. CIV. PRO. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim)). In doing so, the
District Court rejected the FTC's contentions in its complaint (1) that the settlement agreement be-
tween Solvay and Watson is an unfair method of competition; (2) that the settlement agreement among
Solvay, Paddock, and Par is an unfair method of competition; and (3) that Solvay engaged in unfair
methods of competition by eliminating the threat of generic competition to AndroGel and thereby
monopolizing the market. See Complaint at TT 106-113, Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Watson Pharms. Co.,
Inc., No. CV. 09-00598 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2009). i.e., d[id] not provide for exclusion going beyond
the patent's term or operate to exclude clearly noninfringing products, regardless of whether considera-
tion flowed to the alleged infringer.
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was not likely to prevail" in the patent litigation because Watson and Par produced
substantial evidence that Solvay's patent was invalid and/or unenforceable and
that their generic drug did not infringe. 8 "The difficulty," according to the court,
"is [in] deciding how to resolve the tension between the pro-exclusivity tenets of
patent law and the pro-competition tenets of antitrust law," a difficulty that "is
made less difficult by the law's pro-precedent tenets" and "[o]ur earlier decisions"
which "carry us much of the way to a resolution [of the] case."1 89
In reviewing the Eleventh Circuit precedent, all of which reject the FTC's po-
sition, the court discussed the bases for these earlier decisions. While noting that
agreements between competitors that keep one competitor from the market to the
benefit of the other, and that increase costs to the public, would normally be
barred by antitrust laws, the panel held that reverse payment cases were "atypical
cases because 'one of the parties [owns] a patent'." 190 This "[made] all the differ-
ence" in the panel's view, because the patent holder "[has] a 'lawful right to ex-
clude others'" from the marketplace. 191 Further, the court explained that even
subsequent invalidation of the patent would not render the agreement unlawful, as
its lawfulness must be considered at the time of settlement, at which time the pa-
tentee had the right to exclude competitors. 192 What counts is the "potential ex-
clusionary power" of the patent at the time of the reverse payment settlement, not
its "actual exclusionary power" unless a court had rendered a negative judgment
of invalidity or unenforceability prior to the settlement. 193 But the court noted that
the mere existence of a patent did not give the parties to a reverse payment settle-
ment carte blanche; the settlement cannot "exclude more competition than the
patent has the potential to exclude." 194 Such agreements remain "vulnerable to
antitrust attack," and are subject to a three-prong analysis" that requires an evalua-
tion of: "(1) the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent; (2) the extent to
which the agreements exceed that scope; and (3) the resulting anticompetitive
effects." 195
188. Id. at 1305-06.
189. Id. at 1306.
190. Id. at 1307 (quoting Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharms., Inc., 344 F.3d 1294, 1304 (11th Cir.
2003)).
191. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1307 (quoting Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1304).
192. Id. at 1308 (quoting Valley Drug, 344 F.3d at 1305).
193. Id. at 1308 (emphasis original).
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1308, 1310 (citing Schering Plough, 402 F.3d at 1066). In another footnote, the court also
clarified the meaning of the term "strength of the patent" as used in the Schering Plough case:
The FTC's brief in this case places great weight on our statement in Schering-Plough that a
proper antitrust analysis of reverse payment agreements needs to "evaluate the strength of the pa-
tent." 402 F.3d at 1076 (emphasis added). The FTC argues that evaluating the "strength of the
patent" means evaluating "the strength of the patent holder's claims of validity and infringement,
as objectively viewed at the time of settlement." We disagree. When read in the context of the
facts and the reasoning of Schering-Plough, the phrase "strength of the patent" refers to the po-
tential exclusionary scope of the patent - that is, the exclusionary rights appearing on the patent's
face and not the underlying merits of the infringement claim. Nowhere in the Schering-Plough
opinion did we actually evaluate the merits of the infringement claim when defining how much
competition the patent could potentially exclude from the market. Id. at 1311 n.8.
The court also provided useful contrast between these earlier cases denying antitrust liability with one,
Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Elan Corp., 421 F.3d 1227 (11th Cir. 2005), in which the court re-
versed dismissal of an antitrust case brought by a private party. Id. at 1312. In that case, the generic
drug maker "had agreed 'to refrain from ever marketing a generic' version of the patented drug," and
the generic drug maker was permitted to "retain its 180 day exclusivity period" despite having "no
[Vol. 201472
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The court then synthesized the rule from these cases, ruling that "[a]bsent
sham litigation or fraud in obtaining the patent, a reverse payment settlement is
immune from antitrust attack so long as its anticompetitive effects fall within the
scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent."1 96 The court assessed the
FTC's allegations under this standard. 197 The court declined to adopt the FTC's
rule that "an exclusion payment is unlawful if... it is more likely than not that the
patent would not have blocked generic entry earlier than the agreed-upon entry
date." 198 The court reasoned that "[r]ational parties settle to cap the cost of litiga-
tion and to avoid the chance of losing," noting that "[o]ne side or the other almost
always has a better chance of prevailing, but a chance is only a chance, not a cer-
tainty." 199 Patent litigation is analogous, according to the opinion, and "[w]hen
both sides of a dispute have a substantial chance of winning and losing . . . it is
reasonable for them to settle" without incurring antitrust liability for doing so200
The court also emphasized the burden that the FTC's approach would place
on parties and courts, noting that the FTC's approach would discourage settle-
ments and contravene the general consensus that settlements of litigation should
be encouraged.2 01
intention of marketing the drug" in this country. Id. at 1311-12 (quoting Andrx Pharms., 421 F.3d at
1231, 1235). This resulted in the generic drug maker's 180-day exclusivity period to "act... like a cork
in a bottle" preventing another generic drug maker from entering the market. Id. at 1311. (This tactic
was eliminated by later amendments to the statute wherein the first ANDA filer can forfeit its exclusiv-
ity rights if it fails to market a generic version of a patented drug "within certain time periods." 21
U.S.C. §355(j)(5)(D)).
196. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312.
197. Id. (noting those allegations to be: (1) that Solvay was "not likely to prevail" in the underlying
patent infringement litigation; (2) that accordingly the patent has "no exclusionary potential" (empha-
sis in original); and (3) if a patent has no exclusionary potential, the reverse payment arrangement
"necessarily" exceeds its "potential exclusionary scope" and thus is tantamount to "'buying off a
serious threat to competition.").
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1313. The rationality, rather than possible perfidity, of this behavior is illustrated colorful-
ly as follows:
A party likely to win might not want to play the odds for the same reason that one likely to sur-
vive a game of Russian roulette might not want to take a turn. With four chambers of a seven-
chamber revolver unloaded, a party pulling the trigger is likely (57% to 43%) to survive, but the
undertaking is still one that can lead to undertaking.
Watson Pharm., Inc., 677 F.3d at 1312.
200. Id. The court continued its theme of the rationality of this behavior, citing the opinion in In re
Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.:
No matter how valid a patent is -- no matter how often it has been upheld in other litigation or
successfully reexamined -- it is still a gamble to place a technology case in the hands of a lay
judge or jury. Even the confident patent owner knows that the chances of prevailing in patent lit-
igation rarely exceed seventy percent. Thus, there are risks involved even in that rare case with
great prospects.
Id. (citing 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2003)). In addition, the court noted practical difficul-
ties with the FTC's approach, including "an after-the-fact calculation of how 'likely' a patent holder
was to succeed in a settled lawsuit if it had not been settled," calling it a "retrospective predict-the-
likely-outcome-that-never-came approach" (and noting that "[p]redicting the future is precarious at
best; retroactively predicting from a past perspective a future that never occurred is even more peri-
lous. And it is too perilous an enterprise to serve as a basis for antitrust liability and treble damages.").
Id. at 1313-14.
201. The court also noted that the FTC itself had voiced concerns over the approach now espoused in
appeal:
An after-the-fact inquiry by the Commission into the merits of the underlying litigation is not on-
ly unlikely to be particularly helpful, but also likely to be unreliable. As a general matter, tribu-
nals decide patent issues in the context of a true adversary proceeding, and their opinions are in-
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Finally, the court suggested that the FTC's concerns are likely to be overstat-
ed, because of "the reality that there usually are many potential challengers to a
patent, at least to drug patents" and other generic competitors will arise to chal-
lenge the patent.202 If the FTC is correct that reverse payment arrangements indi-
cate a "weak" or vulnerable patent, the "[b]lood in the water" will likely provoke
a "feeding frenzy" of patent challenges in the Court's view.203 "Although a patent
holder may be able to escape the jaws of competition by sharing monopoly profits
with the first one or two generic challengers, those profits will be eaten away as
more and more generic companies enter the waters by filing their own paragraph
IV certifications attacking the patent."2 04
C. The Third Circuit Rejects the Second, Eleventh and Federal Circuits by
Ruling that Reverse Payment Agreements are Presumptively Illegal Under
a "Quick Look" Truncated Rule ofReason Approach
Together, the aforementioned cases from the Second, Eleventh, and Federal
Circuits defined what became known as "the scope of the patent" test for reverse
settlement payment agreements. Under this test, an agreement that did not exceed
the legitimate scope of the patent, presumed valid by the Patent Act, did not raise
antitrust concerns or liability. This position was soundly rejected by the Third
Circuit in In re K-Dur, where a three-judge panel agreed with the FTC that such
agreements should be presumptively illegal.205 The court established that the
proper approach is to evaluate any agreement alleged to be one that restrains trade
by the "rule of reason," following its appreciation of applicable Supreme Court
formed by the arguments of opposing counsel. Once a case settles, however, the interests of the
formerly contending parties are aligned. A generic competitor that has agreed to delay its entry
no longer has an incentive to attack vigorously the validity of the patent in issue or a claim of in-
fringement.
Id. at 1314.
202. Id. at 1315.
203. Id.
204. Id. (comparing Herbert Hovenkamp, Sensible Antitrust Rules for Pharmaceutical Competition,
39 U.S.F. L. Rev. 11, 25 (2004)("In a world in which there are numerous firms willing and able to
enter the market, an exit payment to one particular infringement defendant need not have significant
anticompetitive effects. If there is good reason for believing the patent [is] invalid others will try the
same thing.")
205. See In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d 197 (3rd Cir. 2012). The facts of the case are
these. The drug K-Dur 20 is a specific formulation of potassium chloride sold by Schering-Plough Co.
(now owned by Merck) and protected by a formulation patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,863,743). Character-
ized as "separate from the FTCs challenge" (but no doubt motivated by it), the plaintiffs here filed
various lawsuits that were consolidated in the District of New Jersey by the Judicial Panel on Multidis-
trict Litigation, fortuitously for plaintiffs and the FTC, in an appellate circuit that had not ruled on the
reverse payment practice. The case named as plaintiffs drug wholesalers (Louisiana Wholesale Drug
Co.) and retailers (CVS Pharmacy, Rite Aid, Walgreens, Eckerd, Safeway, Kroger, Albertson's, Hy-
Vee and Maxi Drug) against Merck & Co. (the successor-in-interest to Schering-Plough) and Upsher-
Smith Laboratories. Id. at 207. A Special Master appointed by the Court filed a Report and Recom-
mendation that the lawsuits be dismissed, based on Schering's right under the patents to "exclude
infringing products until the end of [the patent's] term," and that reverse payment agreements warrant
antitrust scrutiny only if they either exceeded the scope of the underlying patents or if the patent in-
fringement lawsuits brought under the authority of the patents were objectively baseless (grounds that
other appellate circuits had also considered in assessing the legality of reverse payment agreements).
Id. at 208.
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precedent.2 06 In doing so, the court stated that "the finder of fact must decide
whether the questioned practice imposes an unreasonable restraint on competition,
taking into account a variety of factors, including specific information about the
relevant business, its condition before and after the restraint was imposed, and the
restraint's history, nature, and effect."207 This inquiry has three parts, according to
the Third Circuit: there must be a showing of an anticompetitive effect on the
market, which shifts the burden "to the defendant to show that the challenged
conduct promotes a sufficiently pro-competitive effect."208 The antitrust plaintiff
can rebut this showing if it can establish that the restraint on trade is not "reasona-
bly necessary to achieve the [purportedly] pro-competitive objective" asserted by
the antitrust defendant.2 09
The court rejected what it termed "precedent from other Circuits," namely
cases that have almost unanimously found reverse payment agreements to be law-
ful.210 The opinion noted that in each case, the appellate court found the reverse
payments to be lawfully based on the patent's presumption of validity and the
patentee's right to exclude, and that the agreements did not involve an improper
extension of that exclusionary right. The panel opinion termed these considera-
tions the "scope of the patent" test. However, the court declined to follow these
cases, noting that the cases are not binding authority.21
The panel then explained that it did not believe that the "scope of the patent"
test was the appropriate test and should not entitle reverse payments to avoid anti-
trust scrutiny.212 The court formed this conclusion because "that test [in the pan-
el's view] improperly restricts the application of antitrust law and is contrary to
the policies underlying the Hatch-Waxman Act and a long line of Supreme Court
precedent on patent litigation and competition."213 The court provided three
grounds for this conclusion. First, the court stated that it creates "an almost unre-
buttable presumption of patent validity," due to the fact that the settlement "forces
a presumption that the patent holder would have prevailed" in the underlying (and
settled) ANDA litigation.21 4 This presumption has no substantive vitality, accord-
ing to the panel, because it is merely "a procedural device and is not a substantive
right of the patent holder."2 15 The court also believed that using the presumption
of validity to uphold reverse payment agreements was "particularly misguided"
when the basis for the underlying patent infringement defense is non-
infringement, because the burden is properly on the patentee, not the challenger,
206. Id. at 218.
207. Id. at 209 (citing State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997)).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 211-12 (citing Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 344 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir.
2003); Schering-Plough Corp. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005); In re Ta-
moxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig., 466 F.3d 187 (2d Cir. 2006); Arkansas Carpenters Health & Welfare
Fund v. Bayer AG, 604 F.3d 98, 105 (2d Cir. 2010); and In re Ciprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust
Litig., 544 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2008)).
211. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 211, n.8.
212. Id. at 218.
213. Id. at 214.
214. Id. at 214-15.
215. Id. at 214 (citing Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1534 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
75
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to prove infringement.21 6 The panel opinion further "question[ed] the assumption"
that subsequent ANDA filers will come forward to challenge "weak" patents.21
The Third Circuit panel considered the pernicious effects of reverse settle-
ments as being directed to first ANDA filers, which it asserts are the "most moti-
vated" due to the promise of 180 days of market exclusivity.2 18 The panel also
cited several Supreme Court cases for the proposition that patent rights are "a
limited exception to a general rule of the free exploitation of ideas," and that "the
public interest supports judicial testing and elimination of weak patents."21 9 The
panel explicitly limited the scope of its decision to "reverse payments between
patent holders and would be (sic) generic competitors in the pharmaceutical indus-
try."220 It is clear that the panel was motivated at least in part by its perception, as
argued by the FTC, that reverse payment settlement agreements were contrary to
and in contravention of Congressional goals of "increase[ing] the availability of
low cost generic drugs," (despite findings in other circuits that in some circum-
stances reverse payment settlements do just that). 1 Nevertheless, the panel found
that "[t]he line that Congress drew between these competing objectives [of stimu-
lating innovation and furthering the public interest] strongly supports the applica-
tion of rule of reason scrutiny of reverse payment settlements in the pharmaceuti-
cal industry."222 And the panel limited the scope of its decision only to settlements
that involve payments from the patentee to the putative generic competitor, stat-
ing: "[n]othing in the rule of reason test that we adopt here limits the ability of the
parties to reach settlements based on a negotiated entry date for marketing of the
generic drug: the only settlements subject to antitrust scrutiny are those involving
a reverse payment from the name brand manufacturer to the generic challeng-
,,223
er.
The proper procedure under Third Circuit law is thus to use a "quick look"
rule of reason analysis "based on the economic realities of the reverse payment
settlement rather than the labels applied by the settling parties" and that "any
payment from a patent holder to a generic patent challenger who agrees to delay
entry into the market as prima facie evidence of an unreasonable restraint of
trade."224 In doing so, the court also "agreed[d] with the FTC that there is no need
to consider the merits of the underlying patent suit because '[a]bsent proof of
other offsetting considerations, it is logical to conclude that the quid pro quo for
the payment was an agreement by the generic to defer entry beyond the date that
216. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 214.
217. Id. at 215.
218. Id.
219. Id. This in contrast to the 11th Circuit's recognition that:
No matter how valid a patent is -- no matter how often it has been upheld in other litigation or
successfully reexamined -- it is still a gamble to place a technology case in the hands of a lay
judge or jury. Even the confident patent owner knows that the chances of prevailing in patent lit-
igation rarely exceed seventy percent. Thus, there are risks involved even in that rare case with
great prospects.
In re Coprofloxacin Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig., 261 F. Supp. 2d 188, 208 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
220. In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig., 686 F.3d at 216.
221. Id. at 217.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 217-18. According to the court, "the vast majority of pharmaceutical patent settlement
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represents an otherwise reasonable litigation compromise,"' citing the Commis-
sion's Final Order in this matter (that was overturned by the Eleventh Circuit).
Although this case involved the same manufacturer, pharmaceutical product
and similar issues as Schering-Plough Corp. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n in the Eley-
enth Circuit, the Third Circuit reached an opposite result, further dividing the
Circuits on the issue of the legality of reverse payment agreements.
D. The Supreme Court Settles the Split
Following the Eleventh Circuit's decision in Federal Trade Commission v.
Watson Pharmaceuticals, the FTC sought certiorari. Prompted by the disagree-
ment among the Circuits, the Supreme Court granted certiorari, heard oral argu-
ments and ruled 5-3 in favor of the Federal Trade Commission, in the case now
styled FTC v. Actavis, Inc.225 Writing for the majority,26 Justice Breyer reversed
the lower court's dismissal of the FTC's complaint that a "reverse payment" set-
tlement was anticompetitive and violated the antitrust laws. But the Court refused
to accept the FTC's position that such agreements are presumptively unlawful,
holding that lower courts should apply an antitrust "rule of reason" analysis when
evaluating such agreements.
Announcing the Court's opinion, Justice Breyer wrote that reverse payment
settlement agreements can "sometimes violate the antitrust laws," and thus that the
district court should not have dismissed the FTC's case.227 The opinion focused
on the risk to the consuming public posed by settlement of cases where the patent
is invalid or not infringed. Although the Court was willing to accept that the
agreement's "anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary
potential of the patent," this fact did not sufficiently "immunize the agreement
from antitrust [scrutiny]."228 The majority's concern was that, while the holder of
a valid patent may be exempt from antitrust liability when enforcing the exclu-
sionary right, ANDA litigation involves an allegation that either the patent is inva-
lid, in which case the immunization is lost, or the generic product does not in-
fringe, in which case the patent cannot be enforced against the non-infringing
generic drug.22 9 Accordingly, such reverse payment settlement agreements "tend
to have significant adverse effects on competition." 230 For this reason, the majori-
ty believed that "it would be incongruous to determine antitrust legality by meas-
uring the settlement's anticompetitive effects solely against patent law policy,
rather than by measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as
well." 23 1 Consequently,
225. 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013).
226. The majority included Justices Breyer, Kennedy, Ginsburg, Sotomayor and Kagan. Id.
227. Id. at 2227.
228. Id. at 2230.
229. Id. at 2231.
230. Id.
231. Id. Support for this proposition (vigorously disputed by the dissenting Justices; see below) can
be found in Justice Breyer's opinion in several of the Court's earlier cases, including United States v.
Line Material Co., 333 U. S. 287, 308 (1948) (retail price-setting between patentees); United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 333 U. S. 364, 390-391 (1948) (both cases from those days where the only
patents that were valid were those the Court had not yet ruled upon); and Walker Process Equipment,
Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., 382 U. S. 172, 174 (1965) (incongruously, a case that
77
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"[R]ather than measure the length or amount of a restriction solely
against the length of the patent's term or its earning potential, as the
Court of Appeals apparently did here, this Court answered the antitrust
question by considering traditional antitrust factors such as likely anti-
competitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially
offsetting legal considerations present in the circumstances, such as here
those related to patents."232
The opinion also cites several earlier cases where settlement agreements were
held to violate antitrust laws.233 The majority seemed to be seeking some sort of
"balance" with regard to accommodating patent and antitrust policies. Finally the
Court found that the "procompetitive" purposes of the Hatch-Waxman Act are
consistent with having courts apply antitrust principles to reverse payment settle-
234
ment agreements in ANDA litigation.
The majority recognized the Eleventh Circuit's concern that "antitrust scruti-
ny of a reverse payment agreement would require the parties to litigate the validity
of the patent in order to demonstrate what would have happened to competition in
the absence of the settlement," an outcome that "will prove time consuming, com-
plex, and expensive." 235 However, the Court found the "general legal policy favor-
ing the settlement of disputes," insufficient to override the majority's concerns
regarding anticompetitive effects of reverse payment settlement agreements. In
response to the Eleventh Circuit's concern, the majority offered five "considera-
tions" on which it based its holding that the FTC should be permitted to establish
an antitrust violation:
First, the specific restraint at issue has the potential for genuine adverse
effects on competition.... The payment in effect amounts to a purchase
by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right it already
claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue and the pa-
tent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic product.236
The opinion also stated this concern as "[t]he patentee and the challenger
gain; the consumer loses." 237 The majority disregarded the idea that entering into
such an agreement would merely entice additional generic challengers to get in
line to be bought off by the patentee, due to the loss of the 180-day exclusivity for
established one of the grounds for finding reverse payment settlement agreements unlawful, i.e., assert-
ing a patent obtained by "fraud on the Patent Office").
232. F.TC. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2231.
233. These cases were not in the Hatch-Waxman context, but included United States v. Singer Mfg.
Co., 374 U. S. 174 (1963) (where the issue was collusion between three patentees to enforce the
strongest patent against their competitors); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U. S. 371, 378
(1952) (more price fixing) and Standard Oil Co. (Indiana) v. United States, 283 U. S. 163 (1931)
(patentees setting royalty rates). The question of whether any of these situations are at all relevant to
reverse payment settlement agreements was not addressed in the opinion, which merely seemed con-
tent to find cases where the Court has in the past found that settlement "agreements are not outside the
scope of antitrust attack" (and does not consider whether the circumstances surrounding this prior
approbation is in any way related to the question before the Court).
234. F.TC. v. Actavis, Inc 133 S. Ct. at 2242.
235. Id. at 2234.
236. Id. at 2234 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
237. Id. at 2235.
[Vol. 201478
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later ANDA filers, and the 30-month delay in FDA approval raised by ANDA
litigation against subsequent filers.2 38 These considerations convinced the majority
that, rather than producing an untenable situation where the owner of a weak pa-
tent cannot possibly "buy off' all potential competitors, the Hatch-Waxman re-
gime in fact produces a critical generic challenger, the first filer, who if success-
fully bought off by a reverse payment settlement agreement will effectively chill
future challenges by other generic drug makers.239
Second, these anticompetitive consequences will at least sometimes
prove unjustified. [Here, the majority's concern is that a court cannot tell
without inquiry whether a particular reverse payment settlement agree-
ment is or is not "justified" under antitrust principles.] Where a reverse
payment reflects traditional settlement considerations, such as avoided
litigation costs or fair value for services, there is not the same concern
that a patentee is using its monopoly profits to avoid the risk of patent in-
validation or a finding of noninfringement. In such cases, the parties may
have provided for a reverse payment without having sought or brought
about... anticompetitive consequences....240
This uncertainty led the majority to conclude that the district court erred in
dismissing the FTC's complaint, because by doing so it denied the Commission
the chance to establish whether or not there were such justifications for the
agreement.
Third, where a reverse payment threatens to work unjustified anticompet-
itive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power to bring that harm
about in practice.
Once again the majority is concerned with the size of the payment, which a
court can use to be a strong indicator of market power.2 41
Fourth, an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administrative-
ly than the Eleventh Circuit believed.
The majority finds the Eleventh Circuit throws the baby out with the bath-
water by refusing to apply antitrust principles due to the difficulties of litigating
patent infringement and validity (when, of course, the appellate court was merely
recognizing that the impetus for these settlements would disappear should the
parties be required to litigate in an antitrust context what they avoid litigating in
an ANDA context).242
According to the majority, "it is normally not necessary to litigate patent va-
lidity to answer the antitrust question," because "[a]n unexplained large reverse
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 2235-36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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payment itself would normally suggest that the patentee has serious doubts about
the patent's survival."2 43
Fifth, the fact that a large, unjustified reverse payment risks antitrust lia-
bility does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit.244
Here, the majority posits that the parties can settle an ANDA dispute in other
ways by allowing the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee's market prior to
the patent's expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay out prior
to that point.245
The majority summarized these considerations as follows:
In sum, a reverse payment, where large and unjustified, can bring with it
the risk of significant anticompetitive effects; one who makes such a
payment may be unable to explain and to justify it; such a firm or indi-
vidual may well possess market power derived from the patent; a court,
by examining the size of the payment, may well be able to assess its like-
ly anticompetitive effects along with its potential justifications without
litigating the validity of the patent; and parties may well find ways to set-
tle patent disputes without the use of reverse payments. In our view,
these considerations, taken together, outweigh the single strong consider-
ation - the desirability of settlements - that led the Eleventh Circuit to
provide near-automatic antitrust immunity to reverse payment settle-
ments.246
However, the FTC did not entirely win the day, nor did the Court fully agree
with the decisions (or rationales) from the Third and Sixth Circuits. The Court
rejected the FTC's suggestion that these agreements are presumptively unlawful
and that the rule of reason should be applied using a "quick look" or other
shortcut. The majority explained that the "quick look" approach was permissible
only in instances where "an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of
economics could conclude that the arrangements in question would have an anti-
competitive effect on customers and markets."247 Instead, the Court held that the
FTC must establish antitrust liability using a "rule of reason" analysis. In conduct-
ing this analysis, district courts can structure the inquiry to avoid litigating patent
validity, the Court explained. However, the Court left it to these "lower" courts to
determine how exactly to accomplish this.248
243. Id.
244. Id. at 2237.
245. Id. Once again the majority return to the existence of a payment, saying that "the basic antitrust
question" comes down to the reasons for the payment (and, of course, a court's determination of
whether those reasons are valid).
246. Id.
247. Id. (quoting California Dental Assn. v. FTC, 526 U. S., 756, 770 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part)). This treatment is not justified for reverse payment settlement agree-
ments according to the majority, because "the likelihood of a reverse payment bringing about anticom-
petitive effects depends upon its size, its scale in relation to the payor's anticipated future litigation
costs, its independence from other services for which it might represent payment, and the lack of any
other convincing justification." Id.
248. Id. at 2238.
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The Chief Justice wrote the dissent, applying much of the same precedent but
reaching the opposite conclusion.2 49 The dissent contended that the existence of a
patent, cabined within its proper scope, should be enough to justify a reverse
payment settlement of ANDA litigation.250 Instead of following "well-
established" principles of patent law, the dissent asserted that the majority would
"use antitrust law's amorphous rule of reason to inquire into the anticompetitive
effects of such settlements."25 1 Besides finding no support in the patent law or
other statutes for the majority's holding, the dissent objected to the ruling because
it "will discourage the settlement of patent litigation."252 Patent law "provides an
exception to antitrust law, and the scope of the patent... forms the zone within
which the patent holder may operate without facing antitrust liability."253 The
dissent also noted that the only time a settlement was found to violate antitrust law
in past Supreme Court precedent was when the settlement went beyond the
254boundaries of the patent grant. The dissenting opinion dissected the authority
cited by the majority and provided context that contradicted the majority opin-
* 255ion.
The dissenting Justices contended that the majority's fancy that the antitrust
question can be answered without considering the validity of the patent is unreal-
istic, and "depriving [the patentee] of such a defense - if that's what the majority
means to do - defeats the point of the patent, which is to confer a lawful monopo-
ly on its holder."256 And the dissent evinced little faith in the many presumptions
underlying the majority opinion, regarding the mechanics and purpose of the
Hatch-Waxman Act or how district courts will apply the Court's decision.257
249. F.T.C. v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. at 2238 (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) (joined by Scalia & Thom-




253. Id. According to the Chief Justice, "[t]his should go without saying, in part because we've said
it so many times."
254. Id. at 2239 (citing United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1963)). Actions
within the scope of the patent are not subject to antitrust scrutiny unless patents are obtained by fraud
(citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172 (1965)) or the patent-
ee engaged in sham litigation (citing Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures
Industries, Inc., 508 U. S. 49, 60-61 (1993)).
255. Id. at 2240-42. And the history of the application of antitrust law in the patent context is telling:
The majority is therefore right to suggest that these 'precedents make clear that patent-related
settlement agreements can sometimes violate the antitrust laws.' Ante, at 10 (emphasis add-
ed). The key word is sometimes. And those sometimes are spelled out in our precedents. Those
cases have made very clear that patent settlements - and for that matter, any agreements relating
to patents -- are subject to antitrust scrutiny if they confer benefits beyond the scope of the pa-
tent. This makes sense. A patent exempts its holder from the antitrust laws only insofar as the
holder operates within the scope of the patent. When the holder steps outside the scope of the
patent, he can no longer use the patent as his defense. The majority points to no case where a pa-
tent settlement was subject to antitrust scrutiny merely because the validity of the patent was un-
certain. Not one. It is remarkable, and surely worth something, that in the 123 years since the
Sherman Act was passed, we have never let antitrust law cross that Rubicon.
According to the Chief, "settling a patent claim cannot possibly impose unlawful anticompetitive harm
if the patent holder is acting within the scope of a valid patent and therefore permitted to do precisely
what the antitrust suit claims is unlawful." Id. at 2244 (emphasis in original).
256. Id. at 2244 (emphasis in original).
257. Id. at 2245 ("Good luck to the district courts that must, when faced with a patent settlement,
weigh the 'likely anticompetitive effects, redeeming virtues, market power, and potentially offsetting
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IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Actavis will likely make reverse payment
settlement agreements less likely, which can be expected to harm rather than facil-
itate generic competition. Unable to settle, innovator patentees will be motivated
to litigate every case to conclusion, to avoid antitrust scrutiny involving the same
or similar infringement and validity questions more effectively settled in ANDA
litigation. Coupled with the FTC's position that transfer of "anything of value"
from the branded drug maker to a generic competitor should also merit antitrust
scrutiny, there is now much less advantage for either party in an ANDA lawsuit to
settle. As a result, the Court's ruling will impose on generic manufacturers seek-
ing to challenge a patent the costs and risks of ANDA litigation; it is hard to see
how this will motivate the types of generic challenges envisioned in the Hatch-
Waxman Act. It is unlikely that the majority envisioned this consequence, but it is
the outcome that will almost certainly ensue.
legal considerations present in the circumstances."'). The policy implications are bleak regarding
benefits to the consumer:
The irony of all this is that the majority's decision may very well discourage generics from chal-
lenging pharmaceutical patents in the first place. Patent litigation is costly, time consuming, and
uncertain. . . . Generics "enter this risky terrain only after careful analysis of the potential gains
if they prevail and the potential exposure if they lose." . . . Taking the prospect of settlements
off the table -- or limiting settlements to an earlier entry date for the generic, which may still be
many years in the future -- puts a damper on the generic's expected value going into litigation,
and decreases its incentive to sue in the first place. The majority assures us, with no support, that
everything will be okay because the parties can settle by simply negotiating an earlier entry date
for the generic drug manufacturer, rather than settling with money. . . . But it's a matter of
common sense, confirmed by experience, that parties are more likely to settle when they have a
broader set of valuable things to trade.
Id. at 2247 (citations omitted).
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